IT and management in America by Bloom, Nicholas et al.
ISSN 2042-2695 
CEP Discussion Paper No 1258 
February 2014 
IT and Management in America 
Nicholas Bloom 
Erik Brynjolfsson 
Lucia Foster 
Ron Jarmin 
Megha Patnaik 
Itay Saporta-Eksten 
John Van Reenen 
Abstract 
The Census Bureau recently conducted a survey of management practices in over 30,000 plants across 
the US, the first large-scale survey of management in America. Analyzing these data reveals several 
striking results. First, more structured management practices are tightly linked to higher levels of IT 
intensity in terms of a higher expenditure on IT and more on-line sales. Likewise, more structured 
management is strongly linked with superior performance: establishments adopting more structured 
practices for performance monitoring, target setting and incentives enjoy greater productivity and 
profitability, higher rates of innovation and faster employment growth. Second, there is a substantial 
dispersion of management practices across the establishments. We find that 18% of establishments 
have adopted at least 75% of these more structured management practices, while 27% of 
establishments adopted less than 50% of these. Third, more structured management practices are more 
likely to be found in establishments that export, who are larger (or are part of bigger firms), and have 
more educated employees. Establishments in the South and Midwest have more structured practices 
on average than those in the Northeast and West. Finally, we find adoption of structured management 
practices has increased between 2005 and 2010 for surviving establishments, particularly for those 
practices involving data collection and analysis. 
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1. Introduction
A growing literature has highlighted the huge dispersion in productivity across establishments in 
the US. For example, Syverson (2004) finds that establishments at the 90th percentile are almost 
twice as productive at those at the 10th percentile within the same narrowly defined industry. One 
explanation for these differences has been variation in output prices – maybe some firms face 
less competitive markets so can charge more for their products, making them appear more 
productive. However, Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008) find this establishment-level 
dispersion in productivity still remains even after controlling for establishment-level output 
prices in apparently homogeneous product industries like concrete, white pan bread,  and block-
ice. 
An alternative explanation for this dispersion in productivity is the different use of inputs like 
R&D and skills. It may be that some firms outperform others because they spend more on 
developing new products or on training their employees. But again, even after decades of 
research controlling for these knowledge and human capital factors a large dispersion of 
productivity remains (Syverson, 2011). 
In this paper we focus on differences in IT and management practices and their relationship to 
variation in performance. While the popular press and business schools have long stressed the 
impact of the IT revolution and the importance of good management, economists until recently 
have generally had less to say (particularly on management) because of the lack of data.8 Over 
the last few years, however, researchers have started to build international management 
databases highlighting the role of management practices in driving differences in firm and 
national performance (Bloom, Genakos, Sadun and Van Reenen 2012). But the evidence on 
management in America is limited to few hundred firms, making detailed analysis difficult. 
Fortunately, the US Census Bureau recently completed a large management survey of over 
30,000 manufacturing establishments, which we provide the first analysis of in this paper.  
8 There are of course some exceptions, such as Osterman (1994), Huselid (1995), Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi 
(1997), Black and Lynch (2001), Capelli and Neumark (2001) and Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002), but 
as the surveys in Bloom and Van Reenen (2011), Gibbons and Henderson (2011) and Oyer and Lazear (2012) 
point out economists have tended to ignore management as a factor explaining differences in firm performance. 
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We find four main results. First, as show in Figure 1a, structured management practices for 
performance monitoring, targets and incentives and strongly linked to more intensive use of 
information technology. Plants using more structured management practices have higher levels 
of investment in IT per worker (top left panel), more investment in IT overall (top-right panel) 
and conduct more sales over electronic networks (bottom left panel). This is indicative of the 
tight relationship between IT and modern management practices, something that was very 
evidence in the cross-country work on IT and management in, for example, Bloom, Sadun and 
Van Reenen (2012). So not surprisingly, as shown in Figure 1b, structured management practices 
are also tightly linked to better performance. Establishments adopting these practices display 
greater productivity, profitability, innovation (as proxied by R&D and patent intensity) and 
growth. This relationship is robust to wide range of controls including industry, education, 
establishment and firm age, and potential survey noise. The relationship between structured 
management and performance also holds over time within establishments (establishments that 
adopt more of these practices between 2005 and 2010 also saw improvements in their 
performance) and across establishments within firms (establishments within the same firm with 
more structured management practices achieve better performance outcomes) as we will show in 
the regression results. 
 
Second, as shown in Figure 2, there is enormous dispersion of management practices across 
America: 18% of establishments adopt at least 75% of structured management practices for 
performance monitoring, targets and incentives; while 27% of establishments adopt less than 
50% of these practices.  
 
Third, there is a positive correlation between structured management practices and location, firm 
size, establishment-level measures of worker education, and export status. Establishments in the 
South and Midwest have more structured practices on average than those in the Northeast and 
West, as shown in Figures 3 and 4. This geographical difference appears to be partly explained 
by other factors – like firm size and industry – but not entirely. For reasons that are still not 
entirely clear (but could be related to state specific policies), there appears to be a more 
structured style of management practices for establishments located in the South and Midwest. 
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Finally, looking at the “surviving” establishments in 2010 who had been operating for at least 
five years, we find US management appears to have become more structured in the previous 
half-decade, particularly for practices involving data collection and analysis (see Figure 5). This 
may partly reflect the increasing adoption of modern information technologies, like Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP) systems, which make data collection and processing much cheaper, 
easier and more effective. We also find that establishments report learning about new 
management practices most frequently from their headquarters, followed by trade-associations, 
conferences, and consultants. 
 
In Section 2 we describe the survey and the sampling process, in Section 3 we outline the 
relationship between management and performance, while in Section 4 we examine the variation 
in management practices across firms, regions and industries, and over time. We also report 
some analysis of how establishments come to learn about new management practices. In Section 
5 we conclude and highlight areas for future analysis. 
 
2. Survey and Sample  
The Management and Organizational Practices Survey (MOPS) was jointly funded by the 
Census Bureau and the National Science Foundation as a supplement to the Annual Survey of 
Manufactures (ASM). The original design was based in part on a survey tool used by the World 
Bank9 and adapted to the US through several months of development and cognitive testing by the 
Census Bureau.  It was sent by mail and electronically to the ASM respondent for each 
establishment, which was typically the accounting, establishment or human-resource manager. 
Most respondents (58.4%) completed the survey electronically, with the remainder completing 
the survey by paper (41.6%). Non-respondents were given up to three follow-up telephone calls 
if no response had been received within three months.  
 
                                                 
9 See Bloom, Schweiger and Van Reenen (2012). 
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2.1 Survey Questions 
The survey comprised 36 multiple choice questions about the establishment, taking about 20 to 
30 minutes to complete. The questions were split into three sections: management practices (16 
questions), organization (13 questions) and background characteristics (7 questions). 
 
Management: The management practices covered three main sections: monitoring, targets and 
incentives, based on Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), which itself was based in part on the 
principles continuous monitoring, evaluation and improvement from Lean manufacturing (e.g. 
Womack, Jones and Roos, 1990).  
 
The monitoring section asked firms about their collection and use of information to monitor and 
improve the production process. For example, how frequently were performance indicators 
tracked at the establishment, with options ranging from “never” to “hourly or more frequently”. 
The targets section asked about the design, integration and realism of production targets. For 
example, what was the time-frame of production targets, ranging from “no production targets” to 
“combination of short-term and long-term production targets”. Finally, the incentives asked 
about non-managerial and managerial bonus, promotion and reassignment/dismissal practices. 
For example, how were managers promoted at the establishment, with answers ranging from 
“mainly on factors other than performance and ability, for example tenure or family 
connections” to “solely on performance and ability”? The full questionnaire is available on 
http://bhs.econ.census.gov/bhs/mops/form.html. 
 
In our analysis, we aggregate the results from these 16 check box questions into a single measure 
of structured management. The structured management score is the unweighted average of the 
score for each of the 16 questions, where each question is first normalized to be on a 0-1 scale. 
Thus the summary measure is scaled from 0 to 1, with 0 representing an establishment that 
selected the bottom category (little structure around performance monitoring, targets and 
incentives) on all 16 management dimensions and a 1 representing an establishment that selected 
the top category (an explicit focus on performance monitoring, detailed targets and strong 
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performance incentives) on all 16 dimensions. (See the Appendix for more details.).  
 
Organization: The organization section of the survey covered questions on the decentralization 
of power from the headquarters to the establishment manager based on Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson 
and Hitt (2002) and Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012). This asked, for example, where 
decisions were made on pay increases, ranging from “only at headquarters” to “only at this 
establishment”. A second set of questions asked about establishment-manager span of control 
and reporting levels based on  Bloom, Garicano, Sadun and Van Reenen (2011), for example 
asking how many employees report directly to the establishment manager. A final set of 
questions based on Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Kim (2011) asked about data use in decision making, 
for example asking the use of data in decisions making at that establishment with response 
options ranging from “decision making does not use data” to “decision making relies entirely on 
data”. In addition, one question asks about how managers learn about management practices 
with answers concerning a variety of sources (“Consultants”, “Competitors”, etc.). For reasons 
of space we do not describe and analyze these data here (except for the question about learning), 
but leave this for a companion paper in future research. 
 
Background characteristics asked a range of questions about the number of managers and non-
managers at the establishment, the share of both groups that had a bachelor degree, the share of 
employees in a union, and the seniority and tenure of the respondent. 
 
Interview and interviewee characteristics. We also collected a large amount of information on 
the interviewee (e.g. seniority and tenure) and interview process itself (date and day of week of 
interview, whether it was filed online). These will generate measurement error in the 
management score and in some robustness tests we try to control for these “noise” variables (see 
the appendix for detailed description of these “noise” controls).  
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2.2 Sample and Sample Selection  
The MOPS survey was sent to all ASM establishments in the ASM mailout sample.10 Overall, 
49,782 MOPS surveys were sent, of which 47,534 were successfully delivered, and 37,177 filled 
surveys were received, implying a response rate of 78%, which is extremely high for firm 
surveys. For most of our analysis, we further restrict the sample for establishments with at least 
11 non-missing responses to management questions and also have positive value added, positive 
employment and positive imputed capital in the ASM.11  Table 1 shows how our various samples 
are derived from the universe of establishments. 
 
In Appendix Table A1 we report the results for linear probability models for the different steps in 
the sampling process. We show that establishments which were mailed and responded to the 
MOPS survey are somewhat larger. These also tend to be slightly more productive compared to 
the entire ASM mailout sample. While the differences are statistically significant they are 
quantitatively small. For example, in column 5 of Appendix Table A1, we see that an 
establishment that is 10% larger is 0.94 percentage points more likely to be in our clean sample 
compared to the ASM (compared to the mean response rate of 78%) and one that is 10% more 
productive is 0.38 percentage points more likely to be included. 
 
2.3 Additional Performance Data  
In addition to our management data we also use a performance data from other Census and non-
Census data sets. We use establishment level data on sales, value-added and labor inputs from 
the ASM. As described in detail in the Appendix, we also combine capital stock data from the 
Census of Manufactures (CM) with investment data from the ASM and apply perpetual 
inventory method to construct capital stocks at the establishment level. At the firm level, we use 
data from the 2009 Business R&D and Innovation Survey (BRDIS) on R&D expenditure and 
                                                 
10  The Appendix provides more details on external datasets including the ASM and CM and BRDIS.   
11  These naturally require also a successful match to the ASM. Two more technical conditions are that we require 
the establishment to have a valid LBDNUM, as well as to be tabbed in ASM tabulations. We give more details 
about sample selection in each step of the sampling process in the Appendix.  
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patent applications by the establishment’s parent firm. Finally, we use Compustat to calculate 
Tobin’s q for the parent firm and match these measures to establishments with publicly traded 
parent firms. Since the Compustat-SSEL bridge is only updated up to 2005, we focus on analysis 
of the MOPS 2005 recall questions when using Compustat (companies who are publicly listed on 
the US stock market). 
 
Table A2 provides more descriptive statistics on the samples we use for analysis. The mean 
establishment size is 167 employees and the median is 80. The average establishment in our 
sample has been in operation for 22 years, 44% of managers and 9% of non-managers have 
college degrees, 13% of their workers are in unions, 42% export and 69% are part of larger 
multi-plant firms. 
 
3. Management and Performance  
In this section we investigate whether these more structured management practices are related to 
performance. We do not attribute a causal interpretation to the results in the section, but rather 
think about these results as a way to establish whether this management survey is systematically 
capturing meaningful content rather than just statistical noise.  
 
As we saw in Figure 2 a range of performance measures – productivity, profits, growth, export 
status, R&D intensity and patenting - are all rising across the deciles of management score. 
These graphs show basic unconditional correlations, demonstrating that in the raw data 
establishments with more structured management practices are better performing across a wide 
range of measures.  
 
Of course one concern is our management scores are just proxying for some other characteristic 
of the firm, like its size, age, industry or the education of the employees. To examine this we 
include observable controls in a more formal regression analysis. While again this does not 
attempt to establish a causal relation between management and performance, we can at least 
control for a rich set of establishment and firm characteristics. In the following two subsections 
we summarize our findings from this analysis for labor productivity (section 3.1) and for other 
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performance measures (section 3.2).   
 
3.1. Management and Productivity 
We start by looking at the relation between labor productivity and management. Suppose that the 
establishment production function is as given in equation (1): 
௜ܻ,௧ ൌ ܣ௜,௧ܭ௜,௧ఈ ܮ௜,௧ఉ ݁ఊ௑೔,೟݁ఋெ೔,೟      (1) 
where Yit is real value added (output - materials), Ait is productivity (excluding management 
practices), Kit denotes the establishment's capital stock at the beginning of the period, Lit is the 
labor force, Xit is a vector of additional factors like industry and education, and Mit is our 
management score.12 Management is an inherently multi-dimensional concept, so for this study 
we focus on a single dimension, the extent to which firms adopt more structured practices.13  
 
Dividing by labor and taking logs we can rewrite this in an easier form to estimate on the data  
 ܮ݋݃ ൬௒೔,೟௅೔,೟൰ ൌ ߙ log ൬
௄೔,೟
௅೔,೟൰ ൅ ሺߚ ൅ ߙ െ 1ሻ log൫ܮ௜,௧൯ ൅ ߛ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߜܯ௜,௧ ൅ ௜݂ ൅ ݁௜,௧ (2) 
where we have substituted the productivity term for a set of industry (or establishment) fixed 
effects ௜݂ and a stochastic residual eit. Because we may have multiple establishments per firm, 
and sometimes the same person fills out the ASM form for several establishments, we also 
cluster our standard errors at the firm (rather than establishment) level.  
 
In Table 2 column (1) we start by running a basic regression of log(value added/employee) on 
our management score without any controls. We find a highly significant coefficient of 1.272, 
suggesting that every 10% increase in our management score is associated with a 13.6% 
(13.6%=exp(0.1272)) increase in labor productivity. To get a sense of this magnitude,  our 
management score has a sample mean of 0.64 and a standard deviation of 0.152 (see the sample 
statistics in Appendix Table A2), so that a 1 standard-deviation change in management is 
associated with a 21.3% (21.3%=exp(0.152*1.272)) higher level of labor productivity. On a 
lower row of Table 2 at the base of the regression results we also report the increase in 
                                                 
12 We put the management score and xit controls to the exponential simply so that after taking logs we can include 
them in levels rather than logs.  
13 The individual practices are highly correlated which may reflect a common underlying driver or 
complementarities among the practices as they form a coherent system.  
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productivity associated with moving from the 10th to the 90th percentile of the management 
practices distribution – a move from very informal to very structured management – is 63.1% in 
column (1). Hence, the raw correlation of management and labor productivity (value added per 
employee) is both statistically highly significant (a t-statistic of over 25) and quantitatively 
extremely large. 
 
In column (2) of Table 2 we include over 450 NAICS 6-digit industry fixed effects and find the 
management coefficient halves, suggesting much of the correlation between labor productivity 
and management occurs across industries. Nevertheless, the within industry correlation of 
management practices and labor-productivity is still quantitatively very large. Moving from the 
10th to 90th percentile of the management score associated with a 28.7% increase in productivity 
even for establishments within the same narrowly defined 6-digit NAICS industry. 
 
In column (3) of Table 2 we estimate the full specification from equation (1) with industry fixed 
effects and various types of controls for potential survey bias, and again find a large and highly 
significant management coefficient. Controlling for capital intensity, establishment size and 
employee education reduces the coefficient on management only modestly.14 Even after 
conditioning on many observables, a key question that remains is whether our estimated OLS 
management coefficient captures a relation between management and productivity, or whether it 
is just correlated with omitted factors that affect the management score and the productivity 
measure. 
 
Using the 2005 recall questions, matched to the 2005 ASM files, we can construct a two period 
panel of management, productivity and other controls, to at least partially address this concern 
over omitted factors. As long as the unobserved factors that are correlated with management are 
fixed over time at the establishment level (corresponding to fi in equation (1)), we can difference 
them out by running a fixed effect panel regression (same as a long-difference). Column (4) 
reports the results for the 2005-2010 pooled panel regression (including a 2010 time dummy).15 
The coefficient on management, 0.298, is still significant at the 1% level with a substantive 
                                                 
14  Employee education is calculated as a weighted average of managers’ and non-managers’ education.  
15 Note that for each year the sample is smaller, as we now require non-missing controls also for 2005.  
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magnitude – moving from the 10th to 90th percentile of management is associated with a 12.2% 
increase in productivity. Of course this coefficient may still be upwardly biased if management 
practices are proxying for time-varying unobserved coefficients. But the coefficient on 
management could also be attenuated towards zero by measurement error, and this downward 
bias is likely to become much worse in the fixed effect specification. 
 
The rich structure of our data allows us to compare firm-level versus establishment-level 
management practices. In particular, by restricting our analysis to multi-establishment firms, we 
can check whether we can find a correlation between structured management and labor 
productivity within a firm.16 When including a firm fixed effect the coefficient on management is 
identified solely off the variation of management and productivity across plants within each firm 
in 2010.  Column (5) shows our OLS estimates for the sub-sample of multi-establishment firms 
with firm-effects, so that we are comparing across establishments within the same firm. The 
within firm management coefficient of 0.233 is highly significant and quantitatively substantial, 
implying a 9.4% increase in labor productivity when moving from the 10th to the 90th percentile 
of structured management. Hence, even within the very same firm when management practices 
differ across establishments, we find large differences in productivity associated with these 
variations in management practices. The establishments with higher management scores within 
each firm are on average also more productive. 
 
Since columns (3)-(5) condition on other factor inputs like capital, the coefficient on 
management can be interpreted as the association between Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and 
our management score. In columns (6) and (7) we present an alternative approach where we 
explicitly use an estimate of the log of TFP as the dependent variable. We calculate TFP by 
deducting labor and capital from value added, using industry-specific cost-share weights. This 
allows the production function to be industry specific, so is more general than the previous 
columns. We can also drop capital and labor from the right hand side which has some attractions 
as these are endogenously chosen by the firm. The results are comparable to the earlier results: 
the management coefficient remains positive and significant with a similar implied magnitude in 
                                                 
16 Interestingly, in the data we find that 53.2% of the variation in the data is explained by variation in management 
practices across establishments. 
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the cross section (column (6)) or time series (column (7)) dimension. 
 
We also ran a series of other robustness tests, like using z-scores (rather than the 0-1 
management scores), dropping individual questions that might be output related and using ASM 
sampling weights, and found very similar results. Hence, a robust result from Table 2 is that 
establishments reporting more structured management have higher productivity. 
 
3.2. Management, Size, Growth, Profitability, Exports and Innovation 
After establishing the relation between management and productivity, we turn now to 
demonstrate the robust correlation between management and other measures of performance. 
Our first finding is that larger establishments and firms have more structured management 
practices. Figures 6 and 7 plot the average size of establishments and firms against their 
management scores. These figures show that both establishment and firm management scores are 
rising until they reach at least 1000 employees17.  This difference is also quantitatively large – 
for example, going from a firm with 10 employees to a firm with 1000 employees is associated 
with an increase in the management score from about 0.5 to 0.7, which is comparable to moving 
from about the 20th percentile to the 70th percentile of the management score distribution. 
 
One explanation for this strongly positive management-size relationship is that more effectively 
managed firms gain higher market share over time (e.g. Lucas, 1978). Another explanation is 
running large establishments is organizationally complex, so necessarily requires more 
structured, proactive and explicit management practices.18 In other words there may be fixed 
costs of adopting these types of management practices, so only larger establishments will find it 
worthwhile to introduce them. In the current data it is impossible for us to tease out these types 
of different stories and both are likely to be in operation. Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie and 
Roberts (2012) find evidence from experiments on Indian manufacturing establishments that 
                                                 
17 The X axis is logarithmic. In both cases the central estimates of the management score continue to rise until they 
reach 10,000 employees but after about 2000 employees the standard errors become so wide (because of the 
smaller samples of larger establishments and firms) that this increase is no longer statistically significantly. 
18 Most obviously, in an establishment of 10 employees the establishment manager can potentially run the operations 
solely through informal observation and interactions on a daily basis with each employee while in an 
establishment of 1000 employees this is infeasible. 
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exogenous adoption of these more structured management practices enabled firms to increase 
their productivity and expand. In a similar vein, Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012) found 
that the size-management covariance is stronger in environments where better managed firms 
should find it easier to expand (e.g. reallocation was stronger in the US than other countries and 
where competition was higher and labor regulations more flexible). 
 
In Table 3 we examine the other performance measures we plotted against the raw management 
score deciles in Figure 1. Starting in Column (1) of Table 3 we show that establishments with 
more structured management practices grew significantly faster over the last 5 years, even after 
controlling for capital inputs, size, skills, and a full set of industry controls.19 Column (2) looks at 
profitability – measured as operating profits (value added minus wages and salaries) normalized 
by sales – and finds establishments with higher management scores are significantly more 
profitable. Column (3) looks at the sample of establishments which reported management scores 
for both 2010 and 2005 and shows those with improving management scores display 
significantly faster increases in profitability. 
 
In columns (4) and (5) we examine two measures of innovation – R&D spending per employee 
and patents applied for at the US Patent Office per employee – finding that establishments with 
higher management scores also appear to be significantly more innovative on these measures. 
Finally, in column (6) we look at Tobin’s q – a measure of stock-market valuation – for the 
publicly listed parents of establishments in our management sample. We find that firms with 
higher management scores also appear to be more highly valued on the stock-exchange, 
consistent with Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang’s (2002) findings about the importance of 
organizational capital. 
 
In summary, we find strong evidence in Figure 1 and Table 3 that establishments and firms with 
more structured management practices outperform their competitors on a range of performance 
measures, including employment growth, profitability, R&D, patenting and stock-market 
valuations. Since this performance data was collected independently from our management 
                                                 
19 For column 1, we condition on management (and all other controls) in 2005 so that we are looking so subsequent 
growth.  
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survey it suggests that the responses to the management survey were informative about 
establishments’ performance. Establishments and firms adopting these kinds of proactive 
monitoring, targets and incentives practices do seem to robustly outperform those that do not. 
Given this validation test of the management data we now turn to examining the management 
data itself – what patterns do we see in the data and what factors appear to account for 
differences in management practices across firms, industries and regions? 
 
4. Management Practices across Establishments, Regions and Time 
In this section we will first examine some of the differences across establishments and regions in 
our data, and then turn to examining the changes in management practices over time and the 
factors potentially explaining this. 
 
4.1. Differences in Management across Establishment and Regions 
In Table 4 we examine what factors can explain the large spread in management practices across 
establishments and regions shown in Figures 2, 3 and 4. Starting in column (1) we include only 
indicators of the region of location and find that, as indicated in Figure 3, establishments in the 
Northeast (the baseline category) have the least structured management, with those in the 
Midwest and South scoring significantly higher.20 In columns (2) and (3) we look at 
establishment and firm size individually, finding both are significantly positive, consistent with 
Figures 6 and 7. Larger establishments and firms seem to adopt more structured management 
practices. In column (4) we examine establishment age, finding older establishments have 
significantly higher management scores. In column (5) we look at whether the establishment was 
part of a multi-unit parent (part of a firm with other establishments) and find this is significantly 
associated with higher management scores. In column (6) we examine the share of managers and 
employees with a degree, and find both education measures are significantly related to higher 
management scores. In column (7) we examine union membership and find no significant 
correlation, while in column (8) we examine export status and find this is strongly related to be 
                                                 
20 The point estimate for the West is higher than the Northeast, but the difference is not statistically different, so 
could be explained simply by sampling variation. 
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more structured management.  
 
These unconditional correlations are helpful descriptive statistics but are limited because many 
of these factors are interrelated. For example, larger establishments tend to also be older and 
more heavily unionized. We may also worry about variations across industries and sampling 
noise – for example, maybe larger establishments have more senior managers filling out the 
survey who tend to be more positive on their management practices.  
 
So in column (9) of Table 4 we include all of our establishment characteristics simultaneously, 
plus a set of NAICS 6-digit industries dummies, plus a full range of survey noise controls like 
the manager’s position, the survey filing date, and the tenure of the respondent. Interestingly, we 
find all but two of the individual characteristics remain statistically significant and qualitatively 
similar. The first exception is unionization which is now negative and significant, reflecting the 
fact that unionized establishments tend to be larger, which once this is controlled for leads to a 
significant negative correlation. The second is establishment age which now has a negative 
(rather than positive) coefficient, because older establishments also tend to be larger.  
 
An interesting result in column (9) is that controlling for these establishment characteristics helps 
to reduce the differences between regions – for example, the gap between the Northeast and the 
South has fallen by over half from 0.024 to 0.010 points – but remains statistically significant. 
Hence, while differences in industry mix and our establishment characteristics explain a large 
share of the differences across regions, they cannot explain all of them. So there is something 
beyond basic differences in sampling composition which account for the more structured 
management practices of establishments in the South and Midwest. 
 
In order to investigate what factors might account for these regional differences in Table 5 we 
report the management scores broken down by state (for states with at least 250+ 
establishments). We find that the more structured management in the South and Midwest is not 
driven by some outlier state, but appear to reflect generally higher scores across all the states in 
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the region. For example, all of the top-10 states ranked by average management score are in the 
Midwest or South. While we do not currently have a full explanation for these differences across 
states and regions, we are studying these as part of our ongoing research.  
 
4.2. Changes in Management Practices over Time 
In our survey we asked respondents to report on management practices in their establishments in 
both 2010 and 2005, allowing us to evaluate self-reported changes in management over the 
previous half-decade. As we saw in Figure 5, management practices appear to have become more 
structured between 2005 and 2010, at least as reported by respondents of surviving 
establishments. Breaking down these 16 practices into sub-groups we discovered that most of the 
rise in structured management practices has come in practices for data-driven performance 
monitoring. This covered questions 1 to 5 and 8 in the survey, asking respondents about the 
number, frequency and extent of performance monitoring. Establishments with high scores on 
these questions measured a wide range of performance indicators (e.g. production, cost, waste, 
inventory, defects, energy use, absenteeism, deliveries on time etc.), reviewed these with 
managers and non-managers on at least a daily basis, and displayed these measures prominently 
around the establishment. Establishments with low scores collected very little performance data, 
evaluated this infrequently, and typically did not publicly display this information. This increase 
in data driven performance monitoring could reflect the increasing use of Information 
Communication Technology (ICT) which makes it easier for establishments to collect, display 
and analyze performance monitoring. 
 
The other sub-set of questions were incentives and targets (questions 6, 7 and 9-16), which focus 
on management practices around pay, promotions, hiring and firing, alongside the range, depth 
and effectiveness of targets. These practices also appear to be becoming more structured. 
 
To try to investigate the sources of these improvements in management practices we also asked 
respondents about where the managers learned about new management practices. We summarize 
the responses in Table 6. This shows that the most common source of new management 
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practices, reported by 53.7% of our establishments, is the firm headquarters. This suggests that 
one explanation for the more structured management practices of multi-establishment firms 
shown in Table 4 is the ability of individual establishments to learn from other establishments 
within the firm.  
 
Secondly, we see trade associations and conferences are noted by 47.9% of establishments as a 
source of learning of new management practices, suggesting these played an important role in 
diffusing management practices. Next are consultants at 45.2%, reflecting the role of paid 
management consultants in helping firms adopt modern management practices. After this we see 
customers and suppliers (the upstream and downstream members of the supply chain) registering 
as accounting for 39.5% and 36.1% of respondents’ sources of new management practices. 
Finally, a range of other sources including new employees, competitors and “none of the above” 
were reported by about 30% or less of respondents as sources of new management practices. In 
columns (2) and (3) of Table 6 we break the sample down by large and small establishments, 
finding relatively similar results, as we do if we split by establishment age. 
 
5. Conclusions and Future Research 
We report the results from the 2010 Census Bureau Management and Organizational Practices 
Survey of over 30,000 establishments across the US, finding several striking results. First, 
structured management practices are tightly linked to better performance: establishments 
adopting more structured practices for performance monitoring, target setting and incentives 
enjoy greater productivity and profitability, higher rates of innovation and faster employment 
growth. Second, there is a substantial dispersion of these practices across U.S. manufacturing 
establishments. We find that 18% of establishments have adopted at least 75% of structured 
management practices, while 27% of establishments adopted less than 50% of these. Third, 
larger establishments in larger firms, with more educated employees, as well as exporting 
establishments tend to have more structured management practices. Establishments in the South 
and Midwest have more structured management on average than those in the Northeast and 
West. Finally, we find US management appears to have become more structured over the last 
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half-decade for incumbents, particularly for practices involving data collection and analysis. 
This was only an initial investigation, and we are currently continuing to work with the data to 
try and understand in more detail the factors accounting for differences in management practices 
across establishments, firms, industries and regions. We are also looking into refining our 
understanding of the importance of management practices in accounting for differences in 
performance across establishments – for example, in what regions and industries are 
management practices more or less important? Are those operating with high technology in 
highly competitive export markets particularly sensitive to more structured management 
practices? Finally, we are interested in understanding the consistency and complementarity of 
management practices. When and where are structured management practices most correlated 
with each other and with higher performance? What other management practices cluster together 
and when do they predict performance? Do some types of industries and regions have more 
consistent practices within and across establishments, and does learning about and change in 
management practices differ by establishment types? What type of practices fit better together 
and what styles work better in different industries and environments? These and a host of other 
questions we hope we and other researchers will answer as we continue to work on the new 
Management and Organizational Practices Survey (MOPS).  
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Appendix: 
Sample Selection: The universe for the MOPS survey is the 2009 Annual Survey of 
Manufactures mailout sample (ASM). The ASM is a rotating 5 year panel, conducted annually 
by the Census Bureau since 1973 in all years other than years for which the Census of 
Manufactures (CM) is not conducted (years ending in 2 and 7 when the Economic Census is 
conducted). The ASM sample was last revised in 2009, and it includes with certainty all 
manufacturing plants with at least 1,000 employees in the 2007 census and a stratified random 
sample of smaller establishments.21  
 
The MOPS survey was sent to all ASM establishments in the ASM mailout sample. Overall, 
49,782 MOPS surveys were sent, of which 2,248 were undeliverable as addressed. For the 
47,534 surveys which were successfully delivered, 37,177 responses were received, implying a 
very high response rate of 78%. For most of our analysis, we further restrict the sample to 
establishments with at least 11 non-missing responses to management questions and a successful 
match to ASM, which were also included in ASM tabulations, have a valid identifier in the LBD 
(LBDNUM), have positive value added, positive employment and positive imputed capital in the 
ASM (see below for details on capital imputation).  Table 1 shows how the numbers of firms and 
average employment changes as we condition on different sub-samples. 
 
In Appendix Table A1 we report the results for linear probability models for the different steps in 
the sampling process. In column (1) the sample is 2010 ASM observations with positive 
employment and sales, which were tabbed, and the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 
1 if MOPS was sent to the establishment. The right hand side of the regression includes the log 
of employment and a set of region and industry dummies. The establishments which were mailed 
the MOPS survey are somewhat larger. This is not surprising, given that establishments in ASM 
which were not sent the MOPS survey are expected to be either administrative records or 
establishments which exited late in 2010, both expected to be smaller than the average 
establishment. In column (2) we compare MOPS respondents to the MOPS mailout sample, 
finding that MOPS respondents tend to be slightly larger. Finally, in columns (3) to (5) we 
compare our “clean” sample to the sample of respondents and to the ASM sample, finding again 
that the “clean” sample has slightly larger establishments, which are also slightly more 
productive (column 5). 
  
Management Scores: The management score for each establishment is generated in two steps.22 
First, the responses to of the 16 management each questions are normalized on a 0-1 scale. The 
response which is associated with the most structured management practice is normalized to 1, 
and the one associated with the least structured is normalized to zero.  We define more structured 
management practices as those that are more specific, formal, frequent or explicit. For example, 
when asking “...when was an under-performing non-manager reassigned or dismissed?”, the 
response “Within 6 months of identifying non-manager under-performance” is ranked 1 and the 
response “Rarely or never” is ranked 0. If a question has three categories, the “in between” 
                                                 
21 The certainty category slightly differs over industries. For more details on the ASM sample design see: 
http://www.census.gov/manufacturing/asm/how_the_data_are_collected/index.html 
22 The full survey and instructions are available on http://bhs.econ.census.gov/bhs/mops/SUR766_9.html  
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category is assigned the value 0.5. Similarly for four categories the “in between” categories are 
assigned 1/3 and 2/3 and so on.23 Second, the management score is calculated as the unweighted 
average of the normalized responses for the 16 management questions. In robustness tests we 
also evaluated another way to average across the 16 individual scores. We used a management z-
score, which normalizes each question to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 and 
averaging across these. We found that all our results were extremely similar because the average 
z-score is extremely correlated with our main management measure. 
 
Additional Databases: 
Establishment level: Our primary source of establishment level external data is the ASM from 
2003 to 2010. We use the CM from 2002 and 2007 to obtain data on capital stocks, which is then 
combined with the ASM data on investment flows to impute capital stock for 2005 and 2010 (see 
details below). The CM is conducted every 5 years (for years ending 2 and 7) since 1967. It 
covers all establishments with one or more paid employee in the manufacturing sector (SIC 20-
39 or NAICS 31-33) which amounts to 300,000 to 400,000 establishments per survey. Both the 
CM and the ASM provide detailed data on sales, value added, labor inputs, labor cost, cost of 
materials, capital expenditures, inventories and much more. We match the MOPS to the ASM 
using the SURVU_ID variable, and match the ASM to the CM, as well as ASM and CM over 
time using the LBDNUM variable.  Finally, we use the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) 
to describe the universe of establishments in Table 1 of the main paper.  
 
Firm level: We use the 2009 Business R&D and Innovation Survey (BRDIS) data to obtain 
information on R&D spending and patent applications by the parent firm associated with each 
establishment. BRDIS provides a nationally representative sample of all companies with 5 or 
more employees. It is conducted jointly by the Census Bureau and the NSF and collects data on a 
variety of R&D activities. It replaced the Survey of Industrial Research and Development 
(SIRD) in 2008. The BRDIS is matched to the ASM (and then to MOPS) using the LBD. We are 
able to match a total of 13,888 MOPS observations in our “clean” sample to BRDIS observations 
with non-missing data on R&D spending and patent applications.24 We use Compustat to 
calculate Tobin’s q for firms. We then use the FIRMID variable to match establishments to the 
Compustat-SSEL bridge which allows us to match establishments with publicly traded parent 
firms to the parent firm record in Compustat. Since the Compustat-SSEL bridge is only updated 
up to 2005, we focus on analysis of the MOPS 2005 recall questions when using Compustat.  
 
Industry level: We use the NBER-CES data for industry-level price indices for total value of 
shipments (PISHIP), and capital expenditures (PIINV), as well as for total cost of inputs for 
labor (PAY), used in the construction of cost share. We match the NBER data to the 
establishment data using 6-digit NAICS codes.25 We use the BLS multifactor productivity 
                                                 
23  For multiple choice questions which allow for the selection of more than one answer per year, we use the 
average of the normalized answers as the score for the particular question. If the question does not allow for the 
selection of more than one answer, but more than one box is selected, we treat the observation as missing.  
24  See http://www.census.gov/manufacturing/brdis/index.html  and 
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/srvyindustry/about/brdis/interpret.cfm  for more details.  
25   See: http://www.nber.org/data/nbprod2005.html for the public version. We thank Wayne Gray for sharing 
his version of the dataset that is updated to 2009. Since The NBER-CES data are available only up to 2009, we 
use the 2009 values for 2010 for all external data. There are 2 industries (327111, 327112) that are missing  
MATCOST for 2008, and two (331411, 331419) that are missing it starting 2006. These observations are 
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database for constructing industry-level cost of capital and capital depreciation, and the BEA 
fixed assets tables to transform establishment-level capital book value to market value.26   
 
Capital Imputation: As mentioned above, the capital measures are based on the CM 2002 and 
2007 reported book value of assets. We first transform book values to market using the industry-
level BEA fixed assets tables, and then deflate both the initial stock and the investment flows 
using the NBER deflators. We then apply the perpetual inventory method (PIM) to impute 
capital stocks for 2005 and 2010. This procedure only provides us with capital stock values in 
2010 for establishments which were in the CM in 2007 and in the ASM in both 2008, 2009 and 
in the ASM 2010 but do not follow this criteria:  
(a) If investment in 2009 is missing, impute it using the average investment for the plant in 
2008 and 2010 (or 2007 and 2010 if 2008 missing). 
(b) Similarly if investment in 2008 is missing, impute it using 2007 and 2009 (or 2007 and 
2010 if 2009 is missing). 
(c) For 2008 and 2009 births, use the establishment’s 2008 or 2009 investment to initialize 
the capital stock. To do that use the 2007 median ratio of book value to investment for 
new establishments by 6 digit NAICS (winsorized at the 95%, since some industries 
have very small number of observations). Run the PIM again using these initial capital 
stocks, only for observations with missing capital stock in 2010.   
(d) For observations which are still missing capital stock, impute it by using the industry 
median ratio of book value of capital stock to investment (these are establishments 
which appear in 2008 or 2009 but not in 2007, but are not marked as births). Run the 
PIM again only on the establishments with missing capital stock in 2010.  
(e) Finally, if PIM implied zero capital stock for 2010, but investment in 2010 is positive, 
impute the 2010 stock using industry median as in (d).  
 
Performance measures: Below is a summary of the measures used in the analysis: 
Value added per worker: Calculated as establishment value added over total employment. In 
Figure 2 raw (nominal) value added is used, while in Table 2 it is deflated using industry level 
deflators.  
Value added TFP: Value added TFP is calculated using cost shares following for example Foster, 
Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2000). Our calculations of TFP follow closely the appendix in Bloom 
et al. (2012).27   
Employment Growth: We define growth of employment from 2005 to 2010 as (emp2010-
emp2005)/(0.5*emp201+0.5*emp2005). 
Profitability: We measure profitability from ASM data as [value added-total salaries]. In Figure 2 
we use this value for profitability, while in the regressions in Table 3 we use (value added- total 
salaries)/(total value of shipments).  
R&D intensity: R&D intensity is defined as (domestic R&D expenditures)/(domestic 
employees). In the regressions in Table 3 the dependent variable is log(1+R&D intensity).  
                                                                                                                                                             
therefore missing cost shares for (which are used to calculate TFP). For these 4 industries we roll forward the last 
value for which we have cost shares. 
26   For more details about the relevant variables from the BLS and BEA tables, see the appendix to Bloom, 
Floetotto, Jaimovich, Terry and Saporta (2012).  
27   The only difference is that we use a single capital stock, rather than separating equipment and structures, because 
separate stocks are no longer reported in the CM in recent years.  
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Patent intensity: R&D intensity is defined as (patent applications)/(domestic employment). In 
Figure 2 we report this measure multiplied by a 1,000. In the regressions in Table 3 the 
dependent variable is log(1+patent intensity). 
Tobin’s q: We compute Tobin’s q as (Market value + long term debt)/(property, plant and 
equipment + net inventories),  or using the Compustat variable names (mkvalt+ditt)/(ppent+invt). 
 
Interview and Interviewee Characteristics: For many of the regressions we run, we check that 
the results are robust to including interview and interviewee Characteristics, referred to as 
“noise” controls or variables, These include:  
 Measures for the distance between ASM and MOPS reported employment for 2005 and 
2010. These are calculated as the absolute values of the difference between the MOPS and 
ASM reported March employment for 2010 and 2005 respectively.  
 Online filing indicator.  
 Date of filing in calendar weeks and the date squared. This variable would capture 
differences in filing patterns between early and late respondents.  
 Day of week.  
 Tenure of the respondent, calculated as number of years since the respondent started working 
at the establishment (see MOPS question 31).   
 Seniority of the respondent, introduced as a set of dummy variables to capture the categories 
in MOPS question 30 (CEO or Executive Officer, Manager of multiple establishments, 
Manager of one establishment, Non-manager, Other).  
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Appendix Table A1: Linear regressions for sample selection       
  
Mailed MOPS 
vs ASM 
MOPS Respondents 
vs. Mailed MOPS 
Clean sample 
vs. MOPS 
respondents 
Clean 
sample 
vs. ASM 
Clean 
sample 
vs. ASM 
Log(employment) 0.059*** 0.031*** 0.057*** 0.096*** 0.094*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Log(sales/employment)         0.038*** 
          (0.004) 
F-stat (region) 5.591 45.381 1.1 34.665 33.443 
(p-value) (0.001) (0) (0.348) (0) (0) 
F-stat (industry) 10.213 7.871 8.399 15.267 11.948 
(p-value) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Observations 51,461 47,503 36,140 51,461 51,461 
Number of firms 28,905 26,345 20,694 28,905 28,905 
Note: The table reports the results from linear probability regressions. In column 1 the sample is 2010 ASM observations with 
positive employment and sales, which were tabbed, and the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 if MOPS was sent to the 
establishment. In column 2 the sample is the subsample of the one in column 1, also conditioning on MOPS mailed, and the 
dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 if MOPS survey was filled. In column 3 the sample is the subsample of the one in 
column 2, also conditioning on MOPS respondent, and the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 if the observation is in our 
baseline "clean" sample. In columns 4 and 5 the sample is as in column 1, and the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 if 
the observation is in our baseline "clean" sample. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
 
 
Appendix Table A2: Descriptive Statistics 
A. Management Descriptives Mean S.D. p(10) p(25) p(50) p(75) p(90) 
Management score 0.640 0.152 0.427 0.553 0.667 0.753 0.812 
Data driven performance monitoring  0.665 0.180 0.417 0.556 0.694 0.806 0.868 
Incentives and targets 0.623 0.176 0.381 0.526 0.650 0.750 0.825 
B. Establishment Characteristics               
Size 167.0 385.1 15.0 33.6 80.0 174.9 359.0 
Parent firm size 3332.6 8739.8 24.0 60.0 258.3 1938.7 8327.6 
Establishment Age 22.0 12.1 4.0 11.0 24.0 35.0 35.0 
Parent firm age 28.4 10.4 9.0 24.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 
% of managers with degree 43.6% 31.1% 10.0% 10.0% 43.6% 70.0% 90.0% 
% of non-managers with degree 9.4% 12.0% 0.0% 5.0% 5.0% 15.0% 40.0% 
% of union members 12.6% 27.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 70.0% 
Exporter 42.2% 49.4% 0 0 0 1 1 
Multi-unit Parent 69% 46.2% 0 0 1 1 1 
Note: The management score is the unweighted average of the score for each of the 16 questions, where each question is first 
normalized to be on a 0-1 scale. The sample in all columns is all MOPS observations with at least 11 non-missing responses to 
management questions and a successful match to ASM, which were also included in ASM tabulations, have positive value added, 
positive employment and positive imputed capital in the ASM. For the few cases where establishment characteristics had missing 
values (for the degree and union questions), we replaced these with the means in the sample, so to keep a constant sample size. 
P(n) is the value at the n-th percentile, e.g. p(50) is the median value (fuzzed). 
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Table 1: MOPS Surveyed Approximately 32,000 Manufacturing Establishments 
Sample Source Sample Criteria 
Number of 
establishments 
(in thousands) 
Total 
employment 
(in thousands) 
Average 
employment
            
(1) Universe of 
establishments 
LBD None 7,041 134 ,637 19.1 
            
(2) Manufacturing  LBD NAICS 31-33 298 12,027 40.4 
            
(3) Annual Survey of 
Manufactures 
ASM NAICS 31-33, and either over 500 
employees, or in ASM random 
sample. Positive employment and 
sales, and tabbed 
51 7,387 143.5 
            
(4) MOPS respondents MOPS As in (3), also responded to MOPS 36 5,629 155.8 
            
(5) MOPS clean (baseline 
sample) 
MOPS As in (4) with 11+ non-missing 
responses, match to ASM, tabbed in 
ASM and have positive value added, 
employment and imputed capital in 
ASM 2010 
32 5,308 167 
Note: The LBD numbers are from 2009. ASM and MOPS numbers are for 2010.  
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Table 2: Establishments with Higher Management Scores are More Productive  
Dependent variable Log (Value Added Per Employee) Log (Productivity) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Management 1.272*** 0.657*** 0.498*** 0.298*** 0.233*** 0.488*** 0.241*** 
  (0.05) (0.035) (0.037) (0.065) (0.082) (0.035) (0.069) 
                
Log(capital/employee)     0.179*** 0.036* 0.193***     
      (0.007) (0.02) (0.016)     
                
Log(employees)     -0.035*** -0.198*** -0.064***     
      (0.006) (0.029) (0.012)     
                
Share of employees with a 
college degree     0.418*** -0.096 0.421*** 
      (0.041) (0.138) (0.076)     
                
% rise in productivity from 
10th to 90th management %tile 63.1 28.7 21.2 12.2 9.4 20.7 9.7 
Observations 31,793 31,793 31,793 35,688 17,235 31,793 35,688 
Number of establishments 31,793 31,793 31,793 17,844 17,235 31,793 17,844 
Number of firms (clusters) 17,843 17,843 17,843 10,557 3,285 17843 10557 
Noise controls No No Yes No Yes No No 
Sample Baseline Baseline Baseline Both in 2005 
and 2010  
2010 multi-
establishments 
Baseline Both in 2005 
and 2010  
FIXED EFFECTS None Industry Industry Establishment Firm Industry Establishment 
Note: The management score is the unweighted average of the score for each of the 16 questions, where each question is first normalized to be on a 0-1 scale. The 
sample in all columns is all MOPS observations with at least 11 non-missing responses to management questions and a successful match to ASM, which were also 
included in ASM tabulations, have positive value added, positive employment and positive imputed capital in the ASM. In columns 1 through 5 the dependent 
variable is log(real value added over total employment). In columns 6 and 7, the dependent variable is log of value added TFP, calculated using cost shares at the four 
digit level. Whenever establishment fixed effects are applied, both 2005 and 2010 are used, and the regression includes a year dummy for 2010. Noise controls (when 
used) include: (1) measures for the distance between ASM and MOPS reported employment for 2005 and 2010; (2) online filing indicator; (3) date of filing and date; 
(4) day of week; (5) tenure of the respondent; (6) seniority of the respondent. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  
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Table 3: Plants with more Structured Management are Faster Growing, More Profitable, More Innovative and More Valuable 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable Emp. 
Growth 
(t to t+5) 
Profitability  
(Operating 
profit/sales) 
Profitability  
(Operating 
profit/ sales) 
Log(1+R&D 
per employee) 
Log(1+Patent 
per employee) 
Log 
(Tobin‘s q) 
Management 0.149*** 0.058*** 0.041** 0.385*** 0.51*** 0.236** 
  (0.023) (0.01) (0.02) (0.104) (0.101) (0.095) 
Log(capital/employee) 0.064*** 0.01*** 0.002 0.12*** 0.117*** 0.009 
  (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
Log(employees) -0.114*** 0.001 -0.011 0.102*** 0.091*** -0.014 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.008) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) 
Share of employees with degree 0.102*** 0.004 -0.047 1.008*** 0.626*** 0.241*** 
  (0.03) (0.011) (0.038) (0.09) (0.093) (0.093) 
% rise in productivity from 10th 
to 90th management %tile 5.9 2.2 1.6 16.0 21.7 9.5 
Observations 17,844 31,793 35,688 13,888 13,888 4,666 
Number of establishments 17,844 31,793 17,844 13,888 13,888 4,666 
Number of firms (clusters) 8,804 17,843 10,557 4,914 4,914 778 
Sample Both in 2005 
and 2010  
Baseline Both in 2005 
and 2010  
Baseline + in 
BRDIS 
Baseline + in 
BRDIS 
2005, 
Compustat 
FIXED EFFECTS Industry Industry Establishment Industry Industry Industry 
Note: The management score is the unweighted average of the score for each of the 16 questions, where each question is first normalized to be on a 0-1 scale. The 
sample in all columns is all MOPS observations with at least 11 non-missing responses to management questions and a successful match to ASM, which were also 
included in ASM tabulations, have positive value added, positive employment and positive imputed capital in the ASM. In column 1 the dependent variable is change 
in employment growth between 2005 and 2010. The sample also restricts to non-missing employment and controls in the ASM for 2005 and 2010. In columns 2 and 
3 the dependent variable is value added minus wages and salaries over total value of shipments. The sample in column 3 is as in column 1. In column 4 the dependent 
variable is the log of 1+R&D per 1000 employee from BRDIS. In column 5 the dependent variable is the log of 1+patents per 1000 employee from BRDIS. Lastly, in 
column 6, the dependent variable is log of Tobin's q, calculated using Compustat, and matched to ASM using the Compustat Bridge. Tobin q is defined as (market 
value + long term debt)/(book value of capital + inventories). Since the Compustat Bridge is updated only through 2005, this column 5 uses the 2005 management 
scores. In all column we have noise controls: (1) measures for the distance between ASM and MOPS reported employment for 2005 and 2010; (2) online filing 
indicator; (3) date of filing and date^2; (4) day of week; (5) tenure of the respondent; (6) seniority of the respondent. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
The number of clusters is different for columns 1 and 3 because some establishments changed firm ownership between 2005 and 2010.  
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Table 4: Accounting for Differences in Management Practices   
Dependent variable: Management Score      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Northeast baseline        Baseline 
Midwest 0.016***               0.008*** 
  (0.003)               (0.002) 
South 0.024***               0.01*** 
  (0.003)               (0.002) 
West 0.004               0.005* 
  (0.003)               (0.003) 
Log(establishment employees)   0.043***             0.024*** 
      (0.001)             (0.001) 
Log(firm employees)     0.027***           0.015*** 
        (0.001)           (0.001) 
Log(establishment age)       0.01***         -0.006*** 
          (0.001)         (0.001) 
Multi-unit parent         0.09***       0.038*** 
          (0.002)       (0.003) 
Share managers with a degree           0.081***     0.044*** 
               (0.004)     (0.003) 
Share employees with a degree           0.100***     0.064*** 
              (0.008)     (0.007) 
Share of union members              -0.004   -0.044*** 
                (0.003)   (0.003) 
Exporter                0.031*** 0.007*** 
                (0.002) (0.002) 
Noise controls No No No No No No No No Yes 
Note: 31,793 observations in every column. The management score is the unweighted average of the score for each of the 16 questions, where each question is first normalized to be 
on a 0-1 scale. The regressors in column 1 include region dummies, with Northeast being the base. In columns 2 and 3 the regressors are log of establishment and firm employment 
respectively, where firm employment is total employment of the firm's establishments in the ASM. In column 4 the regressor is log of establishment age from the LBD. In column 5 
the regressor is multi-unit parent flag from the LBD. In columns 6 and 7 share of managers and employees with degree, and share of union workers from MOPS are used. In column 8, 
the regressor is the exporter flag from the ASM. Finally, in column 9 we run all the regressors from previous columns and add noise controls: (1) measures for the distance between 
ASM and MOPS reported employment for 2005 and 2010; (2) online filing indicator; (3) date of filing and date^2; (4) day of week; (5) tenure of the respondent; (6) seniority of the 
respondent. All regressions include industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The number of firms (clusters) is 17,843 for all columns.  
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Table 5: Management Scores by States and Regions   
State Score Margin of Error Rank* Region Observations
Alabama 0.612 +/-  0.019 10 South 619 
Arizona 0.584 +/-  0.022 22 West 397 
Arkansas 0.620 +/-  0.020 7 South 406 
California 0.572 +/-  0.008 30 West 2,891 
Colorado 0.580 +/-  0.023 26 West 348 
Connecticut 0.584 +/-  0.018 23 Northeast 415 
Florida 0.576 +/-  0.018 28 South 796 
Georgia 0.623 +/-  0.017 6 South 1,025 
Illinois 0.591 +/-  0.013 17 Midwest 1,584 
Indiana 0.609 +/-  0.015 11 Midwest 1,188 
Iowa 0.624 +/-  0.015 4 Midwest 595 
Kansas 0.631 +/-  0.017 1 Midwest 423 
Kentucky 0.607 +/-  0.020 13 South 645 
Louisiana 0.583 +/-  0.032 24 South 382 
Maryland 0.556 +/-  0.027 35 South 330 
Massachusetts 0.575 +/-  0.017 29 Northeast 667 
Michigan 0.566 +/-  0.014 31 Midwest 1,337 
Minnesota 0.576 +/-  0.015 27 Midwest 876 
Mississippi 0.615 +/-  0.015 9 South 358 
Missouri 0.580 +/-  0.017 25 Midwest 743 
Nebraska 0.609 +/-  0.019 12 Midwest 274 
New Jersey 0.560 +/-  0.018 34 Northeast 628 
New York 0.561 +/-  0.015 33 Northeast 1,074 
North Carolina 0.623 +/-  0.013 5 South 1,176 
Ohio 0.605 +/-  0.010 14 South 1,805 
Oklahoma 0.615 +/-  0.021 8 South 358 
Oregon 0.591 +/-  0.017 18 West 494 
Pennsylvania 0.565 +/-  0.015 32 Northeast 1,646 
South Carolina 0.624 +/-  0.020 3 South 634 
Tennessee 0.626 +/-  0.014 2 South 858 
Texas 0.604 +/-  0.010 15 South 1,981 
Utah 0.585 +/-  0.033 21 West 343 
Virginia 0.603 +/-  0.015 16 South 618 
Washington 0.588 +/-  0.017 20 West 605 
Wisconsin 0.589 +/-  0.013 19 Midwest 1,356 
Region         
Northeast 0.568 +/-  0.007 4  5,071 
Midwest 0.594 +/-  0.005 2  10,455 
South 0.607 +/-  0.005 1  10,496 
West 0.579 +/-  0.006 3  5,771 
All 0.590 +/-  0.003 NA   
Note: Only the 35 states which had at least 250 observations are reported. The means by region and for "All" 
include all 50 states and the District of Columbia. All values are calculated using ASM weights. The management 
score is the unweighted average of the score for each of the 16 questions, where each question is first normalized to 
be on a 0-1 scale. The sample is all MOPS observations with at least 11 non-missing responses to management 
questions and a successful match to ASM, which were also included in ASM tabulations, have positive value 
added, positive employment and positive imputed capital in the ASM. 
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Table 6: Proportion who Learned about Management from: 
  All Large Small 
Headquarters 0.537 0.642 0.457 
Trade associations or conferences 0.479 0.563 0.416 
Consultants 0.452 0.571 0.362 
Customers 0.395 0.451 0.352 
Suppliers 0.361 0.414 0.321 
New employees 0.308 0.410 0.231 
Competitors 0.243 0.269 0.224 
None of the above 0.139 0.072 0.190 
Other 0.074 0.083 0.067 
Observations 31,626 13,590 18,036 
Note: The sample is all MOPS observations with at least 11 non-missing responses to management 
questions and a successful match to ASM, which were also included in ASM tabulations, and have 
positive value added, positive employment and positive imputed capital in the ASM. The proportion 
is out of all non-missing responses for the question number 29 in the survey. Note that 
establishments were allowed to mention more than one source. In column 2, large establishments are 
defined as 100 employee or more. 
          
 
Figure 1a: IT intensity is also associated with structured management
Management decile
Note: The management score is the unweighted average
of the score for each of the 16 questions, where each
question is first normalized to be on a 0-1 scale. The
sample is all MOPS observations with at least 11 non-
missing responses to management questions and a
successful match to ASM, which were also included in
ASM tabulations, and have positive value added, positive
employment and positive imputed capital in the ASM.
Management deciles are calculated using 2010
management scores, and the figures are unweighted.
Figure 1b: Better Performance is Associated With More Structured Management
Note: The management score is the unweighted average of the score for each of the 16 questions, where each question is first
normalized to be on a 0-1 scale. The sample for panels 1, 2 and 4 is all MOPS observations with at least 11 non-missing responses to
management questions and a successful match to ASM, which were also included in ASM tabulations, and have positive value added,
positive employment and positive imputed capital in the ASM. The sample in panel 3 is similar to panel 1, but also conditions on non-
missing total value in the ASM 2005. The sample for panels 5 and 6 is similar to panel 1, also conditioning on non-missing R&D or
patents requests count in the BRDIS survey. Management deciles are calculated using 2010 management scores for all panels. The
deciles are re-calculated for the different samples. The figures are unweighted.
Management decile
Figure 2: The Wide Spread of Management Scores Across Establishments
Note: The management score is the unweighted average of the score for each of the 16 questions, where each
question is first normalized to be on a 0-1 scale. The sample is all MOPS observations with at least 11 non-missing
responses to management questions and a successful match to ASM, which were also included in ASM
tabulations, and have positive value added, positive employment and positive imputed capital in the ASM. Figures
are weighted using ASM weights.
Figure 3: Average Management Scores are Highest in the South and Midwest
Note: The management score is the unweighted average of the score for each of the 16 questions, where each
question is first normalized to be on a 0-1 scale. The sample is all MOPS observations with at least 11 non-
missing responses to management questions and a successful match to ASM, which were also included in ASM
tabulations, and have positive value added, positive employment and positive imputed capital in the ASM. Figures
are weighted using ASM weights.
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Figure 4: Average Management Scores vary Across States
Note: The management score is the unweighted average of the score for each of the 16 questions, where each
question is first normalized to be on a 0-1 scale. The sample is all MOPS observations with at least 11 non-
missing responses to management questions and a successful match to ASM, which were also included in ASM
tabulations, and have positive value added, positive employment and positive imputed capital in the ASM. Figures
are weighted using ASM weights. States with less than 250 observations have been given the values for their
region as reported in Table 5. Differences in shading may not be statistically significant (see Table 5 for margins of
error by state and region).
Management 
score
Figure 5: Average Management Scores Increased between 2005 and 2010,
Especially for Data Driven Performance Monitoring
* Based on recall: When surveyed in 2010, respondents were asked about 2005.
Note: The management score is the unweighted average of the score for each of the 16 questions, where each
question is first normalized to be on a 0-1 scale. The sample is all plants with at least 11 non-missing responses to
the 16 management questions for both 2010 and 2005 recall question. Figures are weighted using ASM weights,
where 2010 weight is also applied to the 2005 recall question.
Figure 6: Average Management Score Rises with Establishment Size
Note: The management score is the unweighted average of the score for each of the 16 questions, where each question is first
normalized to be on a 0-1 scale. The sample is all MOPS observations with at least 11 non-missing responses to management
questions and a successful match to ASM, which were also included in ASM tabulations, and have positive value added, positive
employment and positive imputed capital in the ASM. The figure further restricts to establishment with 10 employees or more, and
windsorizes establishment size at 10,000 employees. The figure was generated using a local mean smoother with Epanechnikov
kernel and 0.25 bandwidth. The X axis is base 10 logarithm.
Size: log10(total employment in the establishment)
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Figure 7: Average Management Score rises with Firm Size
Note: The management score is the unweighted average of the score for each of the 16 questions, where each question is first
normalized to be on a 0-1 scale. The sample is all MOPS observations with at least 11 non-missing responses to management
questions and a successful match to ASM, which were also included in ASM tabulations, and have positive value added, positive
employment and positive imputed capital in the ASM. The figure further restricts to firms with 10 to 10,000 employees. The firm's
management score is the unweighted average of the firm's establishments management scores. The figure was generated using a
local mean smoother with Epanechnikov kernel and 0.25 bandwidth. The X axis is base 10 logarithm.
Size: log10(total employment in the firm)
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